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August, 1951

DICTA

DOUBLE RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
BY PUBLIC CARRIER?
MARY ALICE HIGBEE
of the Fourteenth Judicial District Bar

In the April, 1951, issue of Dicta appears an article by Frances
Hickey Schalow of the University of Denver College of Law, bearing the above title, sans italics.'
What is Mrs. Schalow's hypothetical Mary Doe, or the very
real Mrs. Dodd (plaintiff in No. 2725, Routt County) attempting
to recover? It she asserting two causes of action? The answer is
that she is not. Mrs. Dodd, or Mary, sues for the recovery of
compensatory damages under C.S.A. Ch. 50, Secs. 2 and 3, (1935)
and punitive or exemplary damages under Section 1 of Chapter 50.
No right to double recovery is asserted, nor is it claimed that there
exist two causes of action.
How far are our Colorado courts bound by the Missouri decisions? They are not bound at all, because Colorado has previously
refused to follow earlier Missouri constructions of both the penal
and compensatory sections. Let us first compare Missouri and
Colorado rulings on the penal section, our Section 1. Frederic vs.
D. and R. G. R. R. Co.,2 decided April 6, 1914, says:
"...
indeed, the fact that recovery may be had under it (Sec.
1) without proof whatever of damages conclusively establishes that
it is penal.
... Since we hold the statute penal, it was improper to allow
plaintiffs to prove damages because of the loss of services of and
support by their son ....
The amount of recovery depends solely
on the degree of culpability of the defendant."

Two years previously, March 6, 1912, the Missouri court decided the case of Hegberg vs. St. Louis and S. F. R. Co. 3 and some
years prior thereto, the case of Boyd vs. Ry. 4 While much of what
these cases hold has been overruled by the recent case of Cooper vs.
Kansas City Public Service Co.5 the Hegberg case and others following it, including the Cooper case, approve compensatory damages
under the penal section. The Hegberg case says:
The decision in the Boyd case, supra, declared evidence under
the so-called penal section competent to show the amount of compensatory damages the widow had sustained by reason of the wrongful death of her husband. We see no valid reason why the same rule
would not apply to beneficiaries under the fourth clause of the Section
(See. 1) as well as to those under the preceding clauses.

The case thus holds that compensatory damages are recoverable
under the penal section by any proper plaintiff.
I "Double Recovery for Wrongful Death by Public Carrier?" 28 Dicta 131.
Colo. 90, 140 P. 463.
1147 SW 192 (1912).
236 Mo. 54, 139 SW 561.
5202 SW 2d 42 (1947).
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The Cooper case 6 holds that a plaintiff may elect to sue under
either section, saying:
* * * we have held (Sec. 1) permits them to take into consideration plaintiff's pecuniary injury. (citing cases) . . . The Grier
case (Grier vs. K. C. and C. C. and St. J. R. Co., 286 Mo. 523, 228
SW 454, 458) says that in fixing the penalty the jury 'should take
into consideration both the facts constituting the negligence or
wrongful act, with the attending mitigating and aggrevating circumstances, and those showing the pecuniary loss inflicted.' The
Treadway case affirmed this and only held that a jury in its discretion might disregard these facts in a penalty case.

It is obvious that Missouri and Colorado regard their nearly
identical penal sections as saying two different things: Colorado
says that the penal section is wholly penal, that no element of
compensation may be allowed to enter into damages recovered under it; Missouri declares that while the statute is penal in form, its
purpose is to compensate the plaintiff and plaintiff's pecuniary loss
is an issue.
We must now consider whether Colorado and Missouri construe the compensatory sections similarly. The question is whether
these sections are purely compensatory, or whether they are both
compensatory and punitive. Determinative of the issue is the construction placed upon Section 3:1
* " * and in every such action the jury may give such damages
as they may deem fair and just ....
with reference to the necessary
injury resulting from such death, to the surviving parties, who may
be entitled to sue; and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending such wrongful act, neglect, or default.
(Italics supplied).

Colorado has said, in Moffat vs. Tenny:

s

Since mitigating circumstances relating to the act itself do not
justify an assessment of damages less than compensatory, it is not
reasonable to suppose that the aggravating circumstances contemplated by the statute are such as would justify an assessment of
damages more than compensatory . . . Taken in connection with the
preceding language of the section, we are constrained to hold that the
words 'mitigating and aggravating circumstances attending such
wrongful act' etc., contemplate circumstances not relating to the
wrongful act itself, but such as affect the actual damages suffered
by the surviving party entitled to sue, either by way of diminishing
or enhancing the same. Hence, the section allows compensatory
damages only (Italics supplied.)

Missouri, however, takes a completely different view of this
section. So, in Gray vs. McDonald,9 an earlier case than Moffat
vs. Tenny, 10 the Missouri court said:
Ibid.
S. A., Ch.
817 Colo. 189,
'104 Mo. 303,
10 Supra, note
6

7C.

50, Sec. 3

(1935).

30 P. 348 (1892).
16 S. W. 398 (1891).
8.

See also, 94 ALR 384, 389, notes 12 and 13.
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The real question is whether exemplary damages are to be
allowed in any case where the suit is based upon the before mentioned section . . . Exemplary damages were allowed in many actions
of tort before the passage of the statute in question, and aggravating
and mitigating circumstances were admitted in evidence as affecting
the amount of such damages . . . The expressions aggravating and
mitigating circumstances were well known to the law when used
by the legislature, so that the statute just quoted must mean that
in these actions ... the party suing may recover, not only actual, bt
also exemplary damages. (Italics supplied).

Missouri, then, in cases decided prior to Colorado decisions
on the points, said that in actions under either the penal or the
compensatory sections, the plaintiff may recover both actual and
punitive damages. Colorado ignored those opinions, and has held
that under the penal section, the plaintiff may recover only punitive damages, and the compensatory sections allow only for the
recovery of pecuniary loss.
Mrs. Dodd or Mrs. Schalow's Mary sought to recover only
what Missouri would permit under either section. Because of
Colorado's construction it is necessary to proceed under both in
order to recover actual and exemplary damages. Mrs. Schalow,
Judge A. M. Gooding of the 14th Judicial District, and I conclude
that there is but one cause of action. Judge Gooding and I conclude
that under separate statutory authorizations, the plaintiff in an
action against a common carrier may recover both compensatory
and punitive damages in Colorado.

PERSONALS
Mr. William Stover and Mr. William Allen have formed a
partnership for the general practice of law with offices in the
Poudre Valley National Bank Building at Fort Collins. Mr. Stover
and Mr. Allen were formerly associated with Mr. Herbert Alpert,
prominent member of the Larimer County Bar and of the Colorado Bar Association, who passed away recently.
Mr. Paul E. Wencke, former Larimer County Republican
chairman and former FBI agent, was appointed County Judge
to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Judge Harry H.
Hartman of Larimer County.
Mr. Waldo Riffenburgh and Mr. Ralph Harden announce
the formation of a partnership with offices in the Poudre Valley
National Bank Building in Fort Collins for the general practice
of law.

